Aquinas, “Happiness” [Excerpts]

Below are excerpts from, the Summa Theologica, First Part of the Second Part (Prima Secundæ Partis), Question 2 art. 6, and Question 3, art. 1 and 3.

Question Two: Man’s Happiness

Sixth Article

“Whether Man’s Happiness Consists in Pleasure?”

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:

Objection 1. It would seem that man’s happiness consists in pleasure. For since happiness is the last end, it is not desired for something else, but other things for it. But this answers to pleasure more than to anything else: for it is absurd to ask anyone what is his motive in wishing to be pleased (Ethic. x.2). Therefore happiness consists principally in pleasure and delight.

Obj. 2. Further, the first cause goes more deeply into the effect than the second cause (De Causis 1). Now the causality of the end consists in its attracting the appetite. Therefore, seemingly that which moves most the appetite, answers to the notion of the last end. Now this is pleasure: and a sign of this is that delight so far absorbs man’s will and reason, that it causes him to despise other goods. Therefore it seems that man’s last end, which is happiness, consists principally in pleasure.

Obj. 3. Further, since desire is for good, it seems that what all desire is best. But all desire delight; both wise and foolish, and even irrational creatures. Therefore delight is the best of all. Therefore happiness, which is the supreme good, consists in pleasure.

Boëthius says (De Consol. iii): Any one that chooses to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that pleasures have a sad ending: and if they can render a man happy, there is no reason why we should not say that the very beasts are happy too.

But bodily pleasure cannot result from the perfect good even in that way. For it results from a good apprehended by sense, which is a power of the soul, which power makes use of the body. Now good pertaining to the body, and apprehended by sense, cannot be man’s perfect good. For since the rational soul excels the capacity of corporeal matter, that part of the soul which is independent of a corporeal organ, has a certain infinity in regard to the body and those parts of the soul which are tied down to the body: just as immaterial things are in a way infinite as compared to material things, since a form is, after a fashion, contracted and bounded by matter, so that a form which is independent of matter is, in a way, infinite. Therefore sense, which is a power of the body, knows the singular, which is determinate through matter: whereas the intellect, which is a power independent of matter, knows the universal, which is abstracted from matter, and contains an infinite number of singulars. Consequently it is evident that good which is fitting to the body, and which causes bodily delight through being apprehended by sense, is not man’s perfect good, but is quite a trifle as compared with the good of the soul. Hence it is written (Wisd. vii.9) that all gold in comparison of her, is as a little sand. And therefore bodily pleasure is neither happiness itself, nor a proper accident of happiness.

Reply Obj. 1. It comes to the same whether we desire good, or desire delight, which is nothing else than the appetite’s rest in good: thus it is owing to the same natural force that a weighty body is borne downwards and that it rests there. Consequently just as good is desired for itself, so delight is desired for itself and not for anything else, if the preposition for denote the final cause. But if it denote the formal or rather the motive cause, thus delight is desirable for something else, i.e., for the good, which is the object of that delight, and consequently is its principle, and gives it its form: for the reason that delight is desired is that it is rest in the thing desired.

Reply Obj. 2. The vehemence of desire for sensible delight arises from the fact that operations of the senses, through being the principles of our knowledge, are more perceptible. And so it is that sensible pleasures are desired by the majority.

Reply Obj. 3. All desire delight in the same way as they desire good: and yet they desire delight by reason of the good and not conversely, as stated above (ad 1). Consequently it does not follow that delight is the supreme and essential good, but that every delight results from some good, and that some delight results from that which is the essential and supreme good.

Question Three: What Is Happiness?

First Article

“Whether Happiness Is Something Uncreated?”

We proceed thus to the First Article:

Objection 1. It would seem that happiness is something uncreated. For Boëthius says (De Consol. iii): We must needs confess that God is happiness itself.

Obj. 2. Further, happiness is the supreme good. But it belongs to God to be the supreme good. Since, then, there are not several supreme goods, it seems that happiness is the same as God.

Obj. 3. Further, happiness is the last end, to which man’s will tends naturally. But man’s will should tend to nothing else as an end, but to God, Who alone is to be enjoyed, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i.5, 22). Therefore happiness is the same as God.

On the contrary, Nothing made is uncreated. But man’s happiness is something made; because according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i.3): Those things are to be enjoyed, which make us happy. Therefore happiness is not something uncreated.

I answer that, As stated above (Q.1, A.8; Q.2, A.7), our end is twofold. First, there is the thing itself which we desire to attain: thus for the miser, the end is money. Secondly there is the attainment or possession, the use or enjoyment of the thing desired; thus we may say that the end of the miser is the possession of money; and the end of the intemperate man is to enjoy something pleasurable. In the first sense, then, man’s last end is the uncreated good, namely, God, Who alone by His infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy man’s will. But in the second way, man’s last end is something created, existing in him, and this is nothing else than the attainment or enjoyment of the last end. Now the last end is called happiness. If, therefore, we consider man’s happiness in its cause or object, then it is something uncreated; but if we consider it as to the very essence of happiness, then it is something created.

Reply Obj. 1. God is happiness by His Essence: for He is happy not by acquisition or participation of something else, but by His Essence. On the other hand, men are happy, as Boëthius says (loc. cit.), by participation; just as they are called gods, by participation. And this participation of happiness, in respect of which man is said to be happy, is something created.

Reply Obj. 2. Happiness is called man’s supreme good, because it is the attainment or enjoyment of the supreme good.

Third Article

“Whether One Can Be Happy in This Life?”

We proceed thus to the Third Article:

Objection 1. It would seem that Happiness can be had in this life. For it is written (Ps. cxviii. 1): Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord. But this happens in this life. Therefore one can be happy in this life.

On the contrary, It is written (Job xiv.1): Man born of a woman, living for a short time, is filled with many miseries. But Happiness excludes misery. Therefore man cannot be happy in this life.

I answer that, A certain participation of Happiness can be had in this life: but perfect and true Happiness cannot be had in this life. This may be seen from a twofold consideration.

Secondly, from a consideration of the specific nature of Happiness, viz., the vision of the Divine Essence , which man cannot obtain in this life, as was shown in the First Part (Q. 12, A. 11). Hence it is evident that none can attain true and perfect Happiness in this life.

Reply Obj. 1. Some are said to be happy in this life, either on account of the hope of obtaining Happiness in the life to come, according to Rom. viii.24: We are saved by hope; or on account of a certain participation of Happiness, by reason of a kind of enjoyment of the Sovereign Good.

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