Cyrenaic Hedonism

Diogenes Laertius 2.88–90 (an account of Cyrenaic hedonism) 

Selected text from B. Inwood and L. P. Gerson, The Epicurus Reader: Selected Writings and Testimonia. Hackett Publishing Company. (1994).

88. Particular pleasure is worth choosing for its own sake; happiness, however, is not worth choosing for its own sake but because of the particular pleasures. A confirmation that the goal is pleasure is found in the fact that from childhood on we involuntarily find it [pleasure] congenial and that when we get it we seek nothing more and that we flee nothing so much as its opposite, pain. And pleasure is good even if it comes from the most indecorous sources, as Hippobotus says in his On Choices. For even if the deed is out of place, the pleasure at any rate is worth choosing for its own sake and is good. 

89. They hold that the removal of the feeling of pain is not pleasure, as Epicurus said it was, and that absence of pleasure is not pain. For both are kinetic, while neither absence of pain nor absence of pleasure is a motion, since absence of pain is like the condition [katastasis] of somebody who is asleep. …But further, they say, pleasure is not produced by the recollection or expectation of good things, as Epicurus thought. For the soul’s movement is dissolved by the passage of time.